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3The deal
The deal is done. Agreement has been reached on the 
treaty which will govern the UK’s exit from the European 
Union in an orderly way on 29 March 2019. The British 
and European parliaments now have to ratify the treaty. 
Ratification is far from assured. Britain’s ruling party 
has in effect collapsed. The opposition parties seem 
unwilling to rescue Prime Minister May. No alternative 
prospectus exists that could command a majority in the 
House of Commons as well as the approval of the EU. If 
the UK crashes out of the Union without a deal on  
29 March, catastrophe follows.
THE REVELATION
Given the historical importance of the vote on the deal 
on 11 December, the levels of ignorance and prejudice 
about Britain’s European engagement are astonishing.  
It is ironic that the EU is only starting to be understood 
by British politicians and media as the country is  
on its way out. The moment of revelation is upon 
us through the prism of Brexit. After 45 years of 
membership, stopping and reversing the process of 
European integration across such a broad spectrum  
of public policy is proving enormously difficult for the  
British state. 
Even now, nearly six years after Prime Minister  
Cameron launched his Brexit scam at Bloomberg,  
pro-European Conservative ministers are resigning 
from the government shocked to discover that the EU 
insists on cutting many links with post-Brexit Britain. 
At the same time, eurosceptic ministers are resigning in 
objection to the UK retaining any legal ties and legacy 
commitments to the EU. 
One can readily sympathise with Theresa May. But in 
truth she has not handled Brexit well. She launched 
Article 50 (backed by parliament) before she knew 
where she was going. She set out her red lines in too 
categorical a fashion and has been forced to adjust them 
painfully since. She has won respect for her remarkable 
doggedness but not for a surfeit of agility or charm. Her 
party is irrevocably split.
OPPOSITION OPPORTUNISM
At the same time, the United Kingdom has been ill-
served by its opposition parties, almost all of whom 
promoted the 2016 referendum in the first place and 
pledged to respect its result. Labour has signally failed 
to come up with an alternative prospectus for post-
Brexit Britain which unites its ranks and could be 
acceptable to the European Union. Labour’s version 
of Brexit seems to entail staying in the EU’s internal 
market and customs union on a permanent basis while 
breaking its rules on free movement and state aids. 
Having won the populist battle for Brexit but lost the 
political and economic argument, the Brexiteers in all 
parties are now bankrupt. The DUP wants the best of both 
British and EU worlds – and is absurdly opposing the Irish 
backstop proposal that would deliver precisely what is 
in the best economic interest of Northern Ireland. The 
Lib Dems, having ditched their support for the previous 
referendum now want another one, deciding to oppose 
the Barnier package deal before seeing it. The SNP watch 
with envy the special deal being crafted for Northern 
Ireland and hope that the UK’s Brexit crisis pans out well 
for Scottish independence. 
Having won the populist battle for Brexit  
but lost the political and economic 
argument, the Brexiteers in all parties  
are now bankrupt.
The European Union, for its part, looks on Westminster 
with horror – and continues to raise its level of 
preparedness for all eventualities. 
‘DIPLOMATIC MASTERPIECE’
The Withdrawal Agreement reached at the summit in 
Brussels on 25 November is a very proficient document.1 
It manages to extricate the UK from its obligations as an 
EU member state and turn the rights it enjoyed through 
membership into privileges which will endure, for a 
period, after secession. On behalf of the EU, it minimises 
the collateral damage attendant in losing a large and 
powerful member. Angela Merkel was not wrong to call 
the Withdrawal Agreement a “masterpiece of diplomacy”.2
The Withdrawal Agreement manages to 
extricate the UK from its obligations as an EU 
member state and turn the rights it enjoyed 
through membership into privileges which 
will endure, for a period, after secession.
To soften the blow and to ensure some continuity, a 
transition period is designed to last at least until the end 
4of 2020, extendable to 2022. It is only the Withdrawal 
Agreement that establishes the transition period. If the 
Agreement is defeated in the House of Commons there 
will be no transition period. (I am sorry to have to labour 
this point.) If the UK rejects the Withdrawal Agreement, 
the country will crash out of the EU on 30 March with 
The Withdrawal Agreement
As previously reported, the Withdrawal Agreement is 
notable for the fact that the EU has conceded that the 
UK can stay, at least temporarily, in the EU’s customs 
territory until the future trade agreement is concluded.4 
During this time the UK has to apply the EU’s common 
external tariff, but there will be no tariffs or quotas on 
goods traded with the EU, and no need for rules of proof 
of origin. The UK commits to observe the EU’s regime of 
‘level playing field’ on labour standards, environmental 
protection, taxation, state-aid and competition policies. 
JOINT GOVERNANCE
The Joint Committee set up to oversee the management 
of the Withdrawal Agreement may amend these 
standards in future. The UK will put in place independent 
regulatory authorities which will collaborate with the 
Commission in applying these arrangements.5
Britain will follow the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Justice during the transition period and continue to 
pay due regard to its case-law thereafter. Any matter 
requiring interpretation of EU law will be referred to the 
ECJ, whose jurisdiction will apply in relevant cases to the 
UK for four years after the end of the transition period, 
and in citizens’ rights cases for eight years. 
The transition period in practice will 
not reduce British engagement with the 
corpus of EU law and policy, although it 
will remove British representatives from 
the EU institutions.
The Withdrawal Agreement establishes an arbitration 
tribunal of five judges for cases in which the Joint 
Committee fails to settle a dispute. That this panel will 
in the first instance have to decide whether or not the 
case in hand treads on a matter of EU law signifies a 
concession by the Court of Justice. The Luxembourg court 
has hitherto always objected to the intrusion of another 
judicial authority (notably, the European Court of Human 
Rights at Strasbourg) on to its territory.6 The arbitration 
tribunal is one instance of where the joint governance 
arrangements crafted for the transition period are an 
improvement, at least as far as the UK is concerned, on 
those provided in the EEA treaty for Norway and Iceland. 
The transition period in practice will not reduce British 
engagement with the corpus of EU law and policy, 
although it will remove British representatives from the 
EU institutions. The UK will continue to apply EU trade 
and customs policy and to uphold the EU’s international 
obligations that it entered into when a member state. If 
the transition period is extended into 2021-22, the UK 
will have a say through the Joint Committee in deciding 
its extended financial contributions to the EU budget. 
The rights of EU citizens living in the UK and of British 
citizens living in EU states are well covered in the 
Withdrawal Agreement, although in some cases it  
will be up to the individual 27 EU states to secure 
those rights in terms of national law. Administrative 
procedures will become more complicated and costly. 
Future issues around the ability of EU workers and their 
families to come to Britain will only be decided as part  
of the final agreement. 
Despite Spanish alarums in the last hours, a number of 
important bilateral deals have been reached between the 
UK and Spain concerning Gibraltar. Agreement is reached 
with Cyprus over the treatment of the British bases. The 
EU’s geographical indications on specialities of food and 
drink will be protected. And the financial arrangements 
previously agreed are confirmed.
NORTHERN IRELAND
Under the terms of the Irish backstop, in order to avoid a 
hard North-South border, Northern Ireland will remain 
more closely aligned than Great Britain with the EU 
Customs Code and certain single market rules, especially 
on agriculture, electricity and state aid. This will in 
practice be what the Chequers agreement of July called 
the common rulebook, subject to Commission oversight. 
The Joint Committee will decide when and, if so, how the 
backstop will be ended – but this will not happen until a 
new comprehensive free trade and customs agreement 
between the UK and the EU enters into force. 
The preamble to the Irish Protocol to the Withdrawal 
Agreement says that the UK and EU have the “common 
objective of a close future relationship, which will 
establish ambitious customs arrangements that build 
no transition to anything else. The EU is working now 
at full tilt to put in contingency cliff-edge arrangements 
that will keep the borders with Britain at least passable, 
albeit with effort and cost.3 The UK, alas, is almost wholly 
unprepared for no deal.
5on the single customs territory” described in the 
backstop. This fuels suspicion among the Brexiteers that 
temporising is the order of the day meaning that the 
UK will stay in the EU’s orbit for ever. We will see. But 
the Good Friday Agreement and the common travel area 
between Ireland and the UK are protected, and, although 
never fully understood by many British MPs, that was 
always going to be a primary objective of the British and 
Irish governments, as well as the EU institutions, from 
the outset of the Article 50 negotiations. 
Both sides declare they would prefer the Irish backstop 
not to come into force. For this to materialise, 
negotiations to turn the heads of agreement of the 
Political Declaration into legal text will begin as soon as 
possible after 29 March.
THE FUTURE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT
Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement says that the 
two parties “shall use their best endeavours, in good faith 
and in full respect of their respective legal orders, to 
take the necessary steps to negotiate expeditiously the 
agreements governing their future relationship referred 
to in the Political Declaration … with a view to ensuring 
that those agreements apply, to the extent possible, from 
the end of the transition period”. 
The Political Declaration
The Political Declaration that must accompany the 
Withdrawal Agreement sets out the parameters for any 
viable future relationship between Britain and Europe.7 It 
is not an optional extra. Nor should it glibly be dismissed 
by the British as non-binding. Its purpose is to prepare 
both parties for the serious negotiation of a future 
association agreement involving trade, security, political 
cooperation and joint governance. The Declaration, 
which has been criticised for being both too long and 
too short, could have set out in more detail the content 
of the accord that is being sought, but that might have 
pre-empted the future negotiation itself which, for sound 
legal reasons, cannot be done on the basis of Article 
50.8 As it was, the trade part of the Declaration was 
complicated enough for the 27 to conclude. And some 
vagueness about the future relationship is prudent while 
the UK makes up its mind about what it really wants.
The Political Declaration is not an 
optional extra. Nor should it glibly be 
dismissed by the British as non-binding.
The Political Declaration draws on both the European 
Council guidelines of March 2018 and the British White 
Paper of July. It is a compromise offering Mrs May not 
as much as she wanted in the Chequers agreement, 
but more than the EU had been prepared previously to 
concede. Its purpose is to establish “the parameters of 
an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership across 
trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and 
criminal justice, foreign policy, security and defence 
and wider areas of cooperation”. It foresees a dynamic 
relationship “with high ambition with regard to its scope 
and depth, and [that] might evolve over time”. 
The parties envisage a trading relationship on goods 
that is “as close as possible” given the UK’s insistence on 
the development of an independent trade policy and the 
ending of free movement of people. The free trade area 
will combine “deep regulatory and customs cooperation, 
underpinned by provisions ensuring a level playing field for 
open and fair competition”. The agreement will “build and 
improve on the single customs territory provided for in the 
Withdrawal Agreement”. The regulatory framework will go 
well beyond WTO rules, and customs will make use of “all 
available facilitative arrangements and technologies”.
The Political Declaration is a compromise 
offering Mrs May not as much as she 
wanted in the Chequers agreement, but 
more than the EU had been prepared 
previously to concede.
Trade in services will be “ambitious, comprehensive 
and balanced … respecting each Party’s right to 
regulate”. “Equivalence frameworks” will be established 
for “voluntary regulatory cooperation in areas of 
mutual interest”, including financial services, and 
kept constantly under review, subject to dialogue. The 
principles of no discrimination, reciprocity and mutual 
recognition will be subject only to specified limitations. 
The section on mobility is the least liberal. There will 
be visa-free travel for short-term visits, and suitable 
arrangements for study, research and business. 
Agreements will be sought across the whole spectrum of 
the current acquis, including data protection, intellectual 
property rights, investment, digital trade, capital 
movements, public procurement, aviation, road, rail and 
maritime transport, electricity, gas, civil nuclear power 
and carbon pricing. It is aimed to reach an agreement on 
fish, covering access to waters and quota shares, before 
6July 2020. Cooperation will be continued in global fora 
“where it is in their mutual interest”, with on-going 
commitments to international agreements. 
The UK will be enabled to participate in EU programmes 
in science and innovation, youth, culture and education, 
overseas development and external action, defence 
capabilities, civil protection and space. 
‘A SPECTRUM OF DIFFERENT OUTCOMES’
HM Treasury notes that as the Political Declaration is put 
into legal text, “there could be a spectrum of different 
outcomes”. Both sides agree that “we should be as 
ambitious as possible. The UK has put forward proposals 
that would enable frictionless trade to be achieved 
outside the Customs Union and Single Market. That is 
not something that is accepted by everyone in the EU, 
but the UK has the ability in the future negotiations to 
continue to work for its objective of achieving frictionless 
trade”. 
The Political Declaration covers all the elements of a 
tight security partnership, holding out the possibility 
of deeper UK engagement than it has actually pursued 
while a member state. This doubtless reflects the prime 
minister’s interest in law enforcement and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. The UK is willing to 
associate specifically with the EU’s PNR legislation and 
other data exchange arrangements. It wants to cooperate 
via Europol and Eurojust, to continue to expedite cross-
border criminal justice, and to collaborate on anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorism financing. 
Similar close cooperation is foreseen in foreign policy, 
security and defence. In the context of political dialogue, 
the UK will be invited to participate in informal 
meetings of the Council of ministers of foreign affairs 
(Gymnich). London and Brussels will coordinate their 
sanctions policies. The UK will participate on a case 
by case basis in EU common security and defence 
missions, including military operations and intelligence 
sharing. It will associate routinely with the work of the 
European Defence Agency and the European Defence 
Fund and, exceptionally, with PESCO. Famously, there 
is no agreement at this stage on the UK’s continued 
participation in Galileo, but cooperation will continue 
on space policy, development cooperation, cybersecurity, 
civil protection, health security, illegal migration, and 
counter-terrorism. 
Both sides will be heavily involved in these 
joint	ministerial,	official,	parliamentary	
and judicial institutions. 
Another section of the Political Declaration covers the 
institutions of joint governance. Here one gets a clearer 
picture of the shape of the future association agreement, 
and for its dynamic character, and how it will build on the 
Joint Committee structure established for the transition 
period in the Withdrawal Agreement. The institutional 
set-up will be very familiar to those who have followed the 
story of the Ukraine Association Agreement.9 Both sides 
will be heavily involved in these joint ministerial, official, 
parliamentary and judicial institutions. 
A final section of the Political Declaration details the 
preparatory work needed to schedule the opening and 
conclusion of the formal negotiations. 
Ratification
Given Brexit, the Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration form a large package deal that will work 
for Britain and the EU27 states, including Ireland. MPs 
who want the best possible deal should vote for it. As 
Theresa May’s colleagues in the European Council insist, 
along with the European Commission and Parliament, 
no other deal could have been negotiated that would 
look substantively different. The deal postulates a future 
partnership that is qualitatively more suitable for Britain 
than the free trade deal achieved recently by Canada, or 
the narrow regulatory pact that Norway negotiated with 
the EU in 1991, or the hotchpotch of bilateral treaties 
endured by Switzerland. According to most economic 
forecasts, the deal goes some way to soften the blow 
perpetrated by Brexit.10
THE COMMONS VOTE
Inevitably, the package deal enrages arch-Brexiteers 
because it does not cast Global Britain off into the  
mid-Atlantic. But most of these people are either 
discredited narcissists or nationalist fanatics. Why 
Mrs May continues to try to convince them to support 
her deal in the vote on 11 December is curious: they 
will not vote for it, nor ever would. Seeking in vain to 
limit the division of the Tory party, the prime minister 
seems haunted by the far-right. If she persists in merely 
justifying the deal in Brexiteering terms – as taking  
back control and closing borders – she will deserve to 
lose the vote.
7Given Brexit, the Withdrawal Agreement 
and Political Declaration form a large 
package deal that will work for Britain and 
the EU27 states, including Ireland. MPs 
who want the best possible deal should 
vote for it.
The fact is that the Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration will only be ratified at Westminster if they attract 
the support of disappointed but intelligent Remainers. There 
is a good case to be made for the deal from a pro-European 
perspective: but that case is not being made. 
Improbable as it may seem, the leadership of Labour, the 
Welsh and Scottish nationalists, Lib Dems and DUP have 
all announced that they will vote against the deal on  
11 December. Several Tory Remainers aim to join forces 
with the arch-Brexiteers to complete the humiliation of 
the prime minister.
If Theresa May persists in merely 
justifying the deal in Brexiteering  
terms – as taking back control and  
closing borders – she will deserve to  
lose the vote.
PLANS B
Some MPs, led by Hilary Benn, will support a resolution 
that seeks to avoid a no deal   although precisely how 
they intend to realise their objective is left unstated. Late 
to the game, other MPs, following Nicholas Boles, will 
argue for membership of EFTA and the EEA – a clunky 
and complicated option that does not promise a result 
which is in anyway better (and in some variants worse) 
than that postulated by the Withdrawal Agreement and 
Political Declaration. Both Benn and Boles would lose 
the advantage of the transition period if the Barnier deal 
goes down. 
It is highly improbable that the House of Commons left 
to its own devices can prevent Article 50 from taking its 
course. Only the prime minister can ask the European 
Council to extend the Article 50 deadline beyond 29 
March, and unless she is specifically mandated by 
parliament to promote an alternative plan, she will not 
do so. The EU heads of government are adamant that 
they will not agree to an extension merely to indulge 
party political chaos at Westminster. 
Nor could Mrs May – or for that matter any other prime 
minister   revoke Article 50 without the passage of 
primary legislation to that end by parliament. There  
has been no majority at Westminster to stop Brexit 
since the referendum.11 We will see in the votes on 
amendments to the ‘meaningful vote’ whether that 
situation has changed radically. 
It is highly improbable that the House 
of Commons left to its own devices can 
prevent Article 50 from taking its course.
If the majority against the prime minister in the 
‘meaningful vote’ is less than 100 it would seem 
reasonable to let her adjust her pitch and have another 
go. 12 The European Council, which meets on 13 
December, might then agree to decorate and flesh out the 
Political Declaration to make it more attractive to the 
pro-Europeans, but they will not concede the EU’s own, 
long-standing red lines.12 The Withdrawal Agreement 
is in any case closed. Any attempt to re-open it would 
be bound to end up with less favourable terms and 
conditions for the UK. 
If the Political Declaration is opened up it is not in 
the British interest if the 27 fly off in all directions. 
The European Council needs to use the document as 
the basis of the negotiating mandate it will give to the 
Commission, and to set in train preparations for the 
formal negotiation of the association agreement which it 
will try to conclude by the end of 2020. 
THE ‘PEOPLE’S VOTE’
If Mrs May loses the ‘meaningful vote’, support for a 
second referendum will grow. That being the case, one 
must be honest about the timing of such a vote: it is 
clearly too late to organise a referendum before 29 March. 
Parliament, moreover, is nowhere near being able to 
agree on the question to be put: even the ‘people’s vote’ 
people are split on the matter. If a plebiscite posed a 
binary choice between Mrs May’s deal on the one hand 
and Remain on the other, the Brexiteers opposing 
both would be effectively disenfranchised. This would 
add to the democratic dangers inherent in parliament 
abrogating for a second time its constitutional duty to 
take tough decisions on behalf of the nation. 
Another referendum on the same topic so soon after 2016, 
even if it resulted in overturning the verdict of the first 
vote, would leave the nation at war with itself. While some 
Leave voters will have had second thoughts after the first 
referendum about the merits of Brexit, many have not; and 
others who voted Remain in 2016 will feel that the first 
8vote should nevertheless be respected. The referendum 
campaign would be bitterly divisive and the likely outcome 
tight. Investors, meanwhile, would continue to desert 
British shores. The EU would be badly destabilised while it 
waited for Britain’s populist adventure to play itself out. 14
Parliament, moreover, is nowhere near 
being able to agree on the question to be 
put: even the ‘people’s vote’ people are 
split on the matter.
As things stand, there seems no sensible way to  
reverse Brexit. Instead, Theresa May should target  
pro-Europeans in her efforts to persuade the Commons 
to accept the Withdrawal Agreement and prepare  
for as constructive a negotiation as possible on the 
basis of the Political Declaration. As an inducement to 
Remainers to support the package, the prime minister 
can promise the Commons a decisive role at future 
stages of the process – for instance, in the July 2020 
decision about whether to initiate an extension to the 
transition period. 
Preparing to rejoin the Union
If only it gets its act together, the pro-European  
majority in the House is in a good position to make 
demands of the government in return for supporting  
the Brexit package. Remain MPs should move on  
from short-term Brexit and return to the cause of  
long-term British membership of the European  
Union. The Commons arithmetic provides an  
opportunity to put the country on the course of  
EU re-entry, even on a fast track. Opposition parties 
should demand of Theresa May that the Queen’s  
Speech, scheduled for June, will contain a proposal  
for legislation to hold a referendum not on the 
retrospective question of Article 50 but, rather,  
on the prospective question of Article 49.15 That  
vote would lay the groundwork for the next  
government to trigger an application to re-join  
the European Union. 
Remain MPs should move on from  
short-term Brexit and return to the  
cause of long-term British membership  
of the European Union.
The prime minister is undoubtedly right when she says 
that the country “just wants us to get on with it”.  
But she must know, after her bitter experience 
in the top job, that Brexit will not settle Britain’s 
European question. The debate will continue, even as 
the association agreement outlined in the Political 
Declaration enters into force. Although practicable  
as a short-term parking place, the association agreement 
is unlikely to bring a sense of long-term settlement  
to the relationship. After 2019 when the new EU 
leadership is in place, and once the impact of Brexit  
has sunk in, the EU will be turning again to 
constitutional reform, leaving the UK as an anxious 
bystander. The Article 49 option will gain traction: it 
would be intelligent for the British political class (for 
once) to get ahead of the game. 
The Article 49 option will gain traction: it 
would be intelligent for the British political 
class (for once) to get ahead of the game.
A referendum on triggering Article 49, even held at the 
same time as the next general election in May 2022, 
could be expected to erase the consequences of the 
2016 vote. It seems reasonable to assume that, after 
experiencing the hiatus of Brexit, the electorate might 
soon be in a mood to reconsider the issue of where 
Britain’s European interests really lie. The Queen’s 
Speech could also commit the government to the  
calling of a Royal Commission or other cross-party 
enquiry into the UK’s long-term European options, 
paving the way for a fresh referendum campaign  
led by a new generation of better educated and 
progressive leaders. 
In the meantime, the transition period will ensure that 
the UK retains the EU acquis at a high level. The longer 
is the delay between leaving the Union and bidding for 
readmission, the greater the divergence from the acquis, 
complicating and prolonging the accession negotiations. 
In the best circumstances, the UK’s application to 
9resume membership of the Union could sensibly focus 
on contemporary practicalities and not on myth and 
nostalgia. Britain would have seized its earliest chance 
to catch up with mainstream, mainland Europe, and to 
recuperate at least some of the losses of Brexit. 
We might also rekindle old sentiments. Jean-Claude 
Juncker, in that way he has, explained the deal to the 
press after the summit on 25 November:
“I don’t think Britain will be a third 
country like other third countries are third 
countries. There is between us something 
which are the remainings of love.”
1 Council of the European Union (2018), “Draft Withdrawal Agreement”, 
Brussels: Council of the European Union.
2 For an official summary of the 585-page document, see the Commission’s 
Q&A fact sheet: European Commission (2018), Brexit Negotiations: What is in 
the Withdrawal Agreement, 14 November, Brussels: European Commission. See 
also the memo on the Irish backstop. 
3 See, for example, European Commission (2018), A Contingency Action Plan, 
13 November 2018, COM(2018) 880 final, 13 November 2018, Brussels: 
European Commission.
4 Duff, Andrew (2018), Brexit: Time to compromise, European Policy Centre, 31 
October 2018, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
5 For a good description of the UK’s new regulatory framework, see Hogarth, 
Raphael, Alex Stojanovic and Jill Rutter (2018), “Supervision after Brexit: 
Oversight of the UK’s future relationship with the EU”, London: Institute for 
Government. 
6 Lock, Tobias (2018), On Thin Ice: the Role of the Court of Justice under the 
Withdrawal Agreement, Verfassungsblog, 15 November 2018.
7 Council of the European Union (2018), “Political Declaration setting out the 
framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom”, Brussels: Council of the European Union.
8 But of Article 217 TFEU according to the procedures laid down in Article 218. 
9 I have covered these issues in several previous papers for the European 
Policy Centre. See the compendium of EPC publications by Larissa Brunner 
and Fabian Zuleeg, Brexit: An unprecedented journey, 26 November 2018.
10 Notably, HM Treasury, EU Exit: Long-term economic analysis, 28 November; 
Bank of England, EU withdrawal scenarios and monetary and financial 
stability, 28 November; and Centre for Economic Performance and the UK 
in a Changing Europe, The economic consequences of the Brexit deal, 27 
November 2018. 
11 I do not deal here with the likely decision of the European Court of Justice 
that a revocation of Article 50 is legally possible. As a member of the 
Convention which drafted Article 50 I have not been in any doubt as to this 
hypothesis. 
12 If she loses by more than 100, the speculation is that Mrs May would resign, 
thereby triggering a Tory leadership contest. 
13 Alternatively or additionally, the European Council could add another 
interpreting or clarifying Declaration to the three (on fisheries and Gibraltar) 
that they attached to the package on 25 November. A declaration of 
assurance that the Irish backstop really means what it says could be useful. 
14 The new European Parliament will assemble in Strasbourg on 2 July. If the 
UK is still a member state at that stage but has not organised elections in the 
UK, Parliament will not be legitimate. .
15 Article 50(5) reminds us that if the UK wishes to return it must do so via 
Article 49 , which sets out the procedure and criteria for the accession of a 
new member state. 
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